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Casenote

Contraceptive Coverage Falls, No More:

Using RFRA to Limit the Scope of Religious
Challenges to the ACA's Contraceptive
Mandatet

1.

INTRODUCTION

Contraceptive coverage is a required part of all new insurance plans

t. The Author would like to thank Professor Zack Buck, Mercer University Law School,
for his invaluable assistance and comments on this Casenote.
1. This requirement of contraceptive coverage covers all contraceptives approved for use
and sale in the United States. Women's PreventativeServs. Guideline: HEALTH RESOURCES
& SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). There
are different types of contraceptives, and, generally, religious persons see a difference
between them. See, e.g., E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 743, 749 (S.D.
Tex. 2013), rev'd, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015). One type is the contraceptives that are
taken as preventatives, and the other type is contraceptives taken after unprotected sex,
or for other reasons, called emergency contraceptives. See generally Contraception and
Birth Control: Condition Information What are the Different Types?, NAT'L INST. CHILD
HEALTH & HUMAN DEV., www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/contraception/conitioninfo/Pages/
types.aspx (last updated Apr. 3, 2013). These are also called abortifacients by religious
persons (or used as a subcategory for certain emergency contraceptives) as they prevent
the implantation of a fertilized egg on the uterine wall. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for
the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445

435

436

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 2 but many
employers' are exempt from this requirement. Other employers have
challenged the contraceptive requirement on religious grounds. In East
Texas Baptist University v. Burwell,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held as follows: (1) the plaintiffs are either
automatically exempt from the contraceptive-coverage mandate or
eligible for accommodation upon application; (2) the challenged
provisions do not violate rights to religious freedom under the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA);6 (3) RFRA applies only to the acts
of the persons claiming protection under it; and (4) RFRA does not allow
religious employers to block third parties from providing contraceptive
coverage for their employees.' This decision fills in the gap left by the
United States Supreme Court after Burwell v. Hobby Lobby" and
provides an illustration of the complexity of the American healthcare
system, even post-ACA.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

East Texas Baptist is a consolidated case, consisting of three separate
district court decisions.
A.

Relevant Facts and ProceduralHistory from the THal Courts

1. East Texas Baptist University v. Sebelius. The plaintiffs in
East Texas Baptist University v. Sebelius9 are East Texas Baptist
University (ETBU), Houston Baptist University (HBU), and Westminster
Theological Seminary (Westminster Seminary). ETBU is an educational
institution and nonprofit corporation associated with the Baptist General
Convention of Texas (BGCT); the BGCT elects nineteen of ETBU's

(2015) (mem.) (No. 15-105). Additionally, there is an "abortion pill," which can effectively
terminate a pregnancy in the first weeks. See generally Contraception,CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/unintendedpregnancy/contra
ception.htm (last updated Apr. 22, 2015).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
3. Unless otherwise stated, the employers referred to are the religious employers. For
the purposes of this casenote, the term "religious employers" refers to religious nonprofit
organizations, corporations, and employers.
4. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2015).
5. 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (mem.) (No. 15-35).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
7. See E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 453, 459, 461.
8. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
9. 988 F. Supp. 2d 743 (S.D. Tex. 2013), rev'd, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015).
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thirty-six board members."o The university charter holds the institution
out as a "religious .

.

. institution of higher education."" ETBU hires

religious faculty, and employees must profess their commitment to God
and live in such a way that honors that commitment. ETBU's beliefs and
teachings are consistent with the Baptist teachings that life begins at
conception and abortion, therefore, kills a human being and is sinful.
The school is self-insured,"3 and the plan, provided through a thirdparty administrator (TPA)," excludes emergency contraceptives."
HBU is also affiliated with the BGCT, as well as the Southern Baptist
Convention.'" Like ETBU, HBU requires all employees to believe in
God and the Bible.' 7 HBU employees are insured, through a TPA,
under a church health plans that does not cover abortions, emergency
contraception, "or other drugs and devices which it considers to be
abortion causing.""
Westminster Seminary is a graduate institution that teaches a
reformed Christianity; the tenets are most often associated with the
Presbyterian faith. Employees must belong to a church, believe in the
tenets of their faith, and live their lives in accord with those tenets.2 o

10. Id. at 748, 748-49, 749, 750.
11. Id. at 749.
12. Id.
13. An employer's insurance plan is considered self-insured when it offers its own plans
for employees. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1158. The employer funds the plans and takes the
risk inherent in the plans upon itself; it will either administrate the plans itself or use a
third-party administrator (TPA). Id.
14. A TPA is "an entity that processes insurance claims and provides administrative
services for" self-insured employers. Id.
15. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
16. Id. The Southern Baptist Convention is a network of over 50,000 churches and
missions that follow the Southern Baptist Christian denomination. The Convention, which
provides a general organizational structure for churches and representatives from member
churches, meets yearly for elections, budget adoption, receiving reports, and transacting
business.About Us:Meet Southern Baptists, SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, www.sbc.net
/aboutus/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
17. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 750. Although students of all faiths are admitted to the
school, the Student Code of Conduct ensures all students (and employees through the scope
of the statement) follow the Baptist tenets, stating that HBU "embraces a biblical position
which honors the sanctity of life and cannot support actions which encourage or result in
the termination of human life through suicide, euthanasia, or abortion-on-demand." Id.
(quoting the HBU Student Code of Conduct).
18. A church plan is "a plan established and maintained (to the extent required in
clause (ii) of subparagraph (B)) for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by
a convention or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 of title
26." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (2012).
19. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id. at 750-51.
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Similar to ETBU and HBU, Westminster Seminary believes that
abortions end human life and are sinful; it objects to abortion, emergency contraceptives, and any contraceptive that prevents a fertilized egg
from implantation.2 1 Employees of Westminster Seminary are insured
through Independent Blue Cross of Philadelphia, which included
coverage for emergency contraceptives and similar drugs and procedures
without the seminary's knowledge.2 2 The insurance provider refused to
remove the coverage from health plans, and after attempts to find a way
out of providing such coverage, Westminster Seminary still must pay for
certain contraceptives.2 3
The plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District
of Texas. After pleadings, they moved for a preliminary injunction
against the government to prevent enforcement of the contraceptive
mandate. Following oral arguments, both parties moved for summary
judgment. 24 The court found for the plaintiffs, granting their request
for summary judgment under RFRA and ordered an injunction against
the government.25 Under the injunction, the government would not be
able to enforce any part of the contraceptive mandate against the
plaintiffs or their insurers.26
2. Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius. CatholicDiocese of
Beaumont v. Sebelius 27 involves, as plaintiffs, the Catholic Diocese of
Beaumont and the Catholic Charities of Southeast Texas, Inc. (Catholic
Charities). The Catholic Diocese of Beaumont is a non-profit organization
of parishes and missions in the Beaumont area. It operates churches,
schools, and religious education programs, in addition to providing social
service programs, in accordance with the Catholic faith. Through a
Christian TPA, the diocese offers a self-insured plan to all eligible

21. Westminster Seminary, in keeping with its religious teachings, believes that life
begins at conception. Id. at 751. Thus, a fertilized egg is a "human embryo," and to prevent
it from implanting would be to kill the unborn child. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Westminster Seminary originally had to pay for all "abortion-causing drugs,
procedures [and] related services," and it was unable to find an alternative insurer who
would not include such services in the insurance policy. Id. During litigation, Westminster
Seminary was able to sever pharmaceutical coverage from medical care coverage in order
to not provide coverage for abortifacients. However, the insurance plan still covers some
intra-uterine devices to which Westminster Seminary objects. Id.
24. Id. at 743, 748.
25. Id. at 772.
26. Id.
27. 10 F. Supp. 3d 725 (E.D. Tex. 2014), rev'd, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015).
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employees. 28 This plan does not cover any contraceptives or abortifacients because the use of such are contrary to Catholic teachings.2 9
Catholic Charities is a nonprofit organization operating in compliance
with the Catholic faith. It provides services for the communities with
which it works, exemplifying the Catholic mission to provide aid to the
needy. Catholic Charities is considered an entity of the Catholic Diocese
of Beaumont because a substantial portion of its annual budget comes
from the diocese, and the bishop must ensure that the charity's
programs align with Catholic teachings.o As such, Catholic Charities
contends that the self-certification process" would violate the organization's beliefs because it would authorize contraceptive coverage not
currently covered by the chosen insurance policy, and facilitating the
provision of contraceptives is contrary to the tenets of the Catholic
Church.3 2
Based on the record compiled at the end of the initial hearing, the
plaintiffs requested that the court grant them an injunction." The
court granted the plaintiffs' request, issuing a permanent injunction
against the federal government." The injunction prevented the
government from enforcing the requirements that (1) the plaintiffs fill
out the self-certification form or pay for contraceptive coverage, (2) the
plaintiffs' health plans include contraceptive coverage if the selfcertification form is not filed, and (3) third-party administrators and
insurers must provide contraceptive coverage for the plaintiffs' employees. 35

28. The Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust offers the insurance plan. Id. at
731.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 730-31.
31. Self-certification is one of the processes through which an employer eligible for
accommodation may state its intention to use the accommodation to get out of the
contraceptive mandate. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (holding
that religious employers who are qualified to receive an accommodation to the contraceptive mandate are not required to fill out Employee Benefits Security Administration Form
700 (Form 700) and that written notice to the Secretary is an acceptable alternative). The
certification must be in the manner and form the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(Secretary) specifies, which is through either Form 700 or a letter to the Secretary. Id.
Form 700 is a standardized form that is sent to the insurer or TPA. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d
at 1157. Once the insurer or TPA receives Form 700 or a letter from the Secretary, they
are responsible for contraceptive coverage for employees. Id. at 1163; Catholic Diocese of
Beaumont, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 730.
32. Catholic Diocese of Beaumont, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 730.
33. Id. at 728.
34. Id. at 736-37.
35. Id. at 737.
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3. Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth v. Sebelius. The
University of Dallas (UD), one of the plaintiffs in Roman Catholic
Diocese of Fort Worth v. Sebelius,3 6 is a private, Catholic institution."
Although open to all faiths, UD "is shaped by the long tradition of
Catholic learning . .. [and] is dedicated to the recovery of the Christian
intellectual tradition and to the renewal of Catholic theology in fidelity
to the church and in constructive dialogue with the modern world.""
Pursuant to the Catholic faith, the health insurance plan offered to UD
employees does not cover contraceptives or abortifacients. UD believes
the self-certification process would require it to support the facilitation
of contraceptives, thus violating its religious beliefs."
UD filed suit, seeking a preliminary injunction against the government.40 It wanted the district court to enjoin enforcement of the
contraceptive mandate.4 ' The court was persuaded by the decision in
East Texas Baptist University v. Sebelius and adopted that district
court's analysis.42 Therefore, the court granted UD its injunction on
December 31, 2013, preventing the government from enforcing any part
of the contraceptive mandate, including penalties for non-compliance.4 3
B.

Circuit Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated
the government's appeals from the three district court cases into East
Texas Baptist and issued its decision on June 22, 2015." With Judge
Jerry E. Smith authoring the opinion, the unanimous decision reversed
those of the trial courts and remanded the cases to their respective
district courts.45 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the challenged
provisions of the ACA do not violate religious freedom rights under
RFRA; rather, RFRA applies solely to the acts of persons claiming its
protection.4 6 Moreover, RFRA does not allow religious employers to

36. No. 4:12-CV-314-Y, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185410 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2013), rev'd,
793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015).
37. Id. at *2.
38. Mission & Vision, UNIV. OF DALLAS, http://www.udallas.edulabout/mission.php (last
visited Jan. 28, 2015).
39. Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185410, at *2, *4.
40. Id. at *5.
41. Id. at *4-5.
42. Id. at *6.
43. Id. at *6-7.
44. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 449.
45. Id. at 452.
46. d at 459.
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block third parties from supplying contraceptive coverage to employees. 47 On November 6, 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari for East Texas Baptist, and other petitions pending on the
same subject, as one consolidated case.4 8 The Court will be addressing
two distinct issues: (1) whether the contraceptive mandate violated
sincerely held religious beliefs and RFRA, 9 and (2) whether Hobby
Lobby is controlling and, if so, whether the mandate can stand under
that precedent."

47. Id. at 459, 463.
48. 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (mem.) (No. 15-35);
Geneva Coll. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), cert.
granted sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 529 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1418); Priests for
Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
136 S. Ct. 446 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1453); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum.
Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Roman Cath. Archbishop v.
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1505); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the
Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015)
(mem.) (No. 15-105); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151
(10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015)
(mem.) (No. 15-119); Geneva Coll. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d
422 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015)
(mem.) (No. 15-191).
49. Zubik v. Burwell, Question Presented, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.
gov/qp/14-01418qp.pdf; Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Question
Presented, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/14-01453qp.pdf; Roman
Catholic Archbishop v. Burwell, Question Presented, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.
supremecourt.gov/qp/14-01505qp.pdf; Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v.
Burwell, Question Presented, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15
00105qp.pdf.
50. E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, Question Presented, SUPREME CT. U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-00035qp.pdf; S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, Question
Presented, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-OOll9qp.pdf; Geneva
Coll. v. Burwell, Question Presented, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp
/15-00191qp.pdf. Zubik will likely be the named case because those plaintiffs were the first
to file a petition. Rather than taking a representative sample, the Court has decided to look
at each of the individual cases that had a petition pending at the time certiorari was
granted. E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, Computerized Docketing System and Case
Names: Case Number 15-35, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.
aspx?filename=/docketfiles/15-35.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2016). The Court granted the
plaintiffs' motion to divide the oral argument and increase the time allowed for oral
arguments. E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, No. 15-35, 2016 U.S. Lexis 631 (Jan. 15,
2016). A divided argument allows for more clarity in what is a complex issue, and the
consolidation of seven distinct cases makes the issue more complex.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

Free Exercise Under the First Amendment
The First Amendment5 ' provides that "Congress shall make no law
. . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."52 While the right to
religious belief is absolute, courts have allowed legislatures to limit the
free exercise of religion since the 1800s." Particularly, religious
practices may be limited when they are contrary to laws of general
applicability.5 4 The general standard is that the government must show
that religious practices are a "substantial threat to public safety, peace
or order" for the regulation of the practices to withstand judicial
scrutiny."
In Sherbert v. Verner,16 the Supreme Court laid out the test for
determining when a court may allow the government to regulate a
person's religious freedom (Sherbert test). First, the court must
determine whether there is a religious exercise at issue." Second, the
court decides whether enacting and enforcing the challenged legislation
places a substantial burden on the religious exercise.5 9 If there is a
substantial burden, then the court determines if the legislation furthers
a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
acting on such interest; it will then balance the interests of the
parties.60
Later decisions define what the courts constitute as a substantial
burden on religious exercise and what they consider to be a compelling
government interest."' Accommodating a person's religious beliefs
cannot restrict the proper working of the legislature.62 In Bowen v.
Roy," the Court addressed a religious objection to the federal govern-

A.

51.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

52. Id.
53. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
54. Id. at 166-67.
55.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
Bowen
62.
63.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 403, 406.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 406.
See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Lee, 455 U.S. at 259.
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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ment's use of Social Security numbers." In that decision, the Court
determined that there can be no substantial burden on religious exercise
when the challenged actions are ones performed by the government, as
opposed to ones mandated by the government for the citizens to
perform." Quoting Justice Douglas' concurrence in Sherbert, the Court
held that the "Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the
individual can extract from the government."6 1
Indirect interference with religious beliefs-especially when the
government interest is compelling-is treated with greater leniency than
statutes directly contradicting religious beliefs." Workings of the
government that interfere with the carrying out of religious beliefs do
not violate the Sherbert test." In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n,69 the Court described what would be a substantial
burden on religious beliefs and thus unconstitutional under Sherbert:
coercion to violate religious beliefs; penalization of religious activities or
beliefs; and denying a person privileges, rights, or benefits, based on
their religious beliefs or exercises.o
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
In 1990, the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith71 changed the standard of review for religious freedom challenges to legislation. 72 The Court declared the compelling interest test set
out in Sherbert as inapplicable for such challenges." In response,
Congress enacted RFRA to restore the compelling interest test to balance
religious liberty and government interests when legislation is challenged.

B.

64. Id. at 695.
65. Id. at 699-700.
66. Id. at 700 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
67. Compare id. at 706, with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (that a
compulsory education policy cannot be enforced against Amish persons because they object
to high school education as against their belief system), and Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402
(noting that it is unconstitutional to deny unemployment benefits to a person who, in
accord with her religious beliefs, refused employment requiring her to work on Saturdays).
68. Nw. Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
69. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
70. Id. at 449.
71. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
72. Id. at 885.
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)-(5), (b) (2012). RFRA applies to all federal laws and their
implementation; it recognizes that laws of neutral application may burden religious
exercise if there is a compellingjustification for the law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2)-(3) (2012);
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The Court added another prong to the RFRA test.75 The burden of

proof to defend the legislation in question will only shift to the government if the legislation's challenger shows that (1) a religious exercise
exists, (2) the exercise is sincere, and (3) application of the legislation
would substantially burden that exercise.7 6
C.

PatientProtection and Affordable Care Act
Congress enacted the ACA on March 23, 2010, following President
Obama's signing of the enrolled bill.7 In over 900 pages of text, the
ACA made significant changes to the healthcare system, working
towards the goal of making "[i]mmediate [i]mprovements in [hIealth
[clare [cloverage for [a]ll Americans."" Under the ACA, large employers
are required to provide insurance coverage for all full-time employees.79
A large employer is an employer with at least fifty full-time employees
in the previous calendar year, provided that the employees were not
seasonal workers employed for 120 days or less. 0 Employees are
considered to work full-time when they work an average of at least
thirty hours per week or as otherwise prescribed by the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)."
Employers may decide whether to offer a self-insured health plan or
a plan through an insurance company, but both types of plans must
provide the minimum coverage as defined by the HHS Secretary." The

42 U.S.C. 2000bb-3(a) (2012).
RFRA declares that the "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1(a) (2012). It also establishes an exception to the general rule in a two-part test
that, when met, permits the government to substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). First, the government must establish the burden "is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1). Second,
if the government satisfies that burden, it must prove the legislation "is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1(b)(2).
75. Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1997) (generally citing Sherbert).
76. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428
(2006).
77. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).
78. Id. at tit. 1, subtitle A.
79. I.R.C. § 4980H(a) (West 2015).
80. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (West 2015).
81. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4) (West 2015).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C.S. § 18022 (2015). A self-insured plan
is one where the employer assumes the risk, as opposed to a plan through an insurance
company, where the company assumes the risk. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1158.
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essential health benefits required of all health plans is defined in 42
U.S.C. § 18022.3 One of the required benefits is preventative services,
and the insurance provider must pay the entire cost of these services."
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) promulgated
guidelines that specify the required preventative care services for
women." HRSA includes "[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved
contraceptive methods [and] sterilization procedures" in its guidelines for
preventative care services." Encompassed in these guidelines are
twenty contraceptive methods, four of which prevent a fertilized egg
from attaching to the uterus.
In 2013, HHS enacted 45 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) section
147.13188 to provide a balance between organizations and employers
with religious objections to contraceptive use and female employees who
wish to receive a prescription for contraceptives.8 9 Religious institutions
are automatically exempted from the contraceptive mandate provided
they are a nonprofit entity under sections 6033(a)(3)(C)(i)o or (iii)9

83.

42 U.S.C.S. § 18022.

84. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18022(b)(1)(I). The ACA prohibits insurers from imposing cost-saving
requirements upon employers. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012).

85.

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).

86. Women's Preventative Servs. Guideline, supra note 1.
87. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2754, 2762-63.
88. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(2015) (amending the originally enacted version provided in the
history line of the statute).
89. Id.
90. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(C)(i) (2012).
91. I.R.C. §§ 6033(a)(3)(C)(iii) (2012). Included are any religious organization,
additionally any charitable organization or "organization for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals" if it is supported by government funds or primarily supported by
donations from the public. Id. Any organization that may be covered by these requirements
must also be covered by the description found in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3):
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (Supp. II 2014).
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of the Internal Revenue Code." Certain organizations may apply for an
accommodation if they meet the statutory requirements. 3
Specifically, upon completion of the self-certification process, certain
organizations will be exempt from having to provide contraceptive
coverage to their employees, 9 ' and the HHS Secretary specifies the
manner of the self-certification process." The self-certification may be
made directly to the insurer, and then the insurer has the duty to
exclude contraceptive coverage from the group plan and provide separate
payments to the employees wishing for contraceptive coverage.
Alternatively, the organization may follow the procedures identified in
the regulation, including providing notice to the HHS Secretary, who will
then notify the insurer of its duties.

IV.

COURT's RATIONALE

The Fifth Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs' claims de novo." It reversed
the district court decisions, holding that the plaintiffs did not meet the
substantial burden requirement." Therefore, there was no reason to go
into the other requirements under RFRA, or past those requirements
and into the ones for granting an injunction.oo
The court first focused on the substantial burden requirement under
RFRA because the plaintiffs brought their challenges under that act,'o
and the gateway to the three-part statutory test for a law that burdens
a person's exercise of religion is the plaintiffs' showing that there is such
a substantial burden.102 The court had to decide what degree of
deference it would give the challenger's view on whether the law imposes
a substantial burden. 0 3 The court used a three-part test to determine

92. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a). Organizations who qualify under this provision are
automatically exempt from the contraceptive mandate. Id.
93. Id. § 147.131(b).
94. Id. An organization must oppose providing contraceptive coverage, in part or in
whole, on religious grounds, be a nonprofit entity, and "hold[] itself out as a religious
organization." Id. § (b)(1)-(3).
95. Id. § (b)(4)(v).
96. Id. H# (c)(1)(i) and (c)(2).
97. Id. § (c)(1)(ii).
98. E. Tex. Baptist, 795 F.3d at 455. Appeals from summary judgments are subject to
de novo review. Id. While injunctions are subject to a review for abuse of discretion, the
underlying legal conclusions for them are reviewed de novo. Id.
99. Id. at 463.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 455-56.
102. Id. at 456.
103. Id.
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the solution: "(1) What is the adherent's religious exercise? (2) Does the
challenged law pressure him to modify that exercise? (3) Is the penalty
for noncompliance substantial?"o" Who determines the answer to the
second question was still a question the court had to answer.o' After
examining two free-exercise Supreme Court cases,' 06 the Fifth Circuit
determined that the court decides whether the law pressures a
challenger to modify their religious exercise.'0o
The court examined Roy and Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n to reach this conclusion.' In Roy, the parents challenged the
government's assignment of Social Security numbers because they
believed the number would rob their child's spirit.' 09 The Supreme
Court concluded that there was a distinction between acts performed by
the government and acts required of the challenger, even when both
would burden religious exercise."o The Court stated that the challenger's views must be examined through the Constitution, and the
Constitution will not be viewed through the frame of the challenger's
religious beliefs."' In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, the
government planned to build a road to allow for logging on the public
land the challengers used for religious purposes." 2 The Court relied on
its reasoning in Roy to reject the challengers' claims."' It maintained
that when the government's actions are only to manage its own affairs
and property, the actions do not infringe upon a person's religious
rights." 4

The Fifth Circuit also looked at a RFRA case from the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit to determine
that it-the court itself-is the entity that decides the answer to the
second part of the substantial burden test."' Kaemmerling v. Lappin "6 centered on an inmate's religious objection to the taking and

104. Id. While the court defers to the challenger's answer to the first question, the court
answers the third as a matter of law. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Nw. Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, 485 U.S. 439; Roy, 476 U.S. at 693.
107. E. Tex. Baptist, 795 F.3d at 456-58; see id. at 457 n.33. The Third, Sixth, Seventh,
and D.C. Circuits have already decided the answer to this question. Id.
108. Id. at 456-57.
109. Id. at 457.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 457-58.
114. Id. at 458.
115. Id.
116. 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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storage of DNA samples."' The D.C. Circuit accepted the religious
beliefs of the inmate as true, but the court refused to give deference to
the argument that the collection and storage interfered with his religious
beliefs.' Challenged legislation does not interfere with religious
beliefs when it does not put "substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.""' The Fifth Circuit
likened Kaemmerling, and East Texas Baptist by extension, to Roy,
where the Court held that the government may function in a way that
violates a person's religious beliefs so long as it is an internal action, not
an imposition on religious persons.1 20
With the standard of law set, the Fifth Circuit turned to the actions
the plaintiffs challenged.' 2 ' Because insurers and TPAs performed the
challenged actions, the court determined that the plaintiffs did not meet
the substantial burden requirement. 122 The court distinguished
between actions required by law and actions triggered by a party.1 2 3
The contraceptive mandate is the former because coverage is required
under the ACA, regardless of whether a religious employer has notified
HHS of its intent to make use of the accommodation.' 2 4 An employer's
refusal to offer contraceptive coverage or seek accommodation does not
relieve the TPA, of either a "group health plan" or a "health insurance
issuer," of its statutory duty to provide contraceptive coverage.' 25
V.

A.

IMPLICATIONS

The Fifth Circuit
East Texas Baptist was a case of first impression for the Fifth

Circuit.1 2 6 The decision is similar to those made by the majority of

other circuits that have heard a challenge on the contraceptive

117. Id. at 677; see also E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 458.
118. Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 679.
119. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
120. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 458; see also Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700.
121. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 459 (looking to the provision of contraceptive coverage
by insurers and TPAs after self-certification by the employer).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 459, 461. The court focuses on the language of the ACA. Id. It is directed
towards "health insurance issuer[s]" and "group health plan[s]" and, therefore, requires
these parties to act with or without the employer telling them that the employer will not
be covering the cost of contraceptives. Id. at 459-60, 461.
126. Id. at 456.
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mandate.1 27 Four of the circuit courts cite to this decision for support
in their rationales.1 28 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit took the opposite approach and found that the waiver
process could violate a religious employer's beliefs; it held that injunctions to prevent enforcement of the contraceptive mandate were the
appropriate action under RFRA.1 29 Pending this year's Supreme Court
decision, multiple matters of law are now settled in the Fifth Circuit.
The court decides, as a matter of law, whether a challenged law
pressures the challenger to modify the exercise of their religion."o
Neither a free exercise of religion under the First Amendment nor a
RFRA challenge previously before the court hinged on this factor.'3
The East Texas Baptist decision is important because the majority of
challengers believe a regulation is forcing them to modify their religious
exercise.1 32 After East Texas Baptist, the government must only
provide more compelling evidence than the challenger, rather than
having to present enough evidence to overcome a strong presumption in
favor of the challenger. 3 1 If, instead, the court were to make this
decision one for the jury, then there is a built-in disadvantage for the

challenger.134

127. See generally id.
128. See Grace Sch. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2015); Mich. Cath. Conf. & Cath.
Fam. Servs. v. Burwell, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14701 (6th Cir. 2015) (reaffirming prior
decision and on remand from the Supreme Court for consideration in light ofHobby Lobby);
Cath. Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2015); Little Sisters of the Poor
Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015).
129. Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th
Cir. 2015). The Eighth Circuit followed the Court's rationale in Hobby Lobby, holding that
the penalty triggered if the challenger does not comply with the mandate constitutes a
substantial burden, rather than requiring the challenger to show that there was a
substantial burden on the religious exercise itself. Id. at 937-38.
130. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 456. Prior to East Texas Baptist, the court could not
question the correctness or reasonableness of one's beliefs; rather, only the sincerity of
those beliefs could be questioned. Whether there is pressure on the challenger to modify
their religious exercise was considered part of the religious beliefs. See Sharpe, 801 F.3d
at 942 ("The question here is . . . whether [the challengers] have a sincere religious belief
that their participation in the accommodation process makes them morally and spiritually
complicit in providing abortifacient coverage. Their affirmative answer to that question is
not for us to dispute.").
131. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 456 n.32.
132. See generally Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 411-12 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
133. See E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 457-59.
134. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-82 (affirming a state law that prohibits the use
of narcotics also applies to their use in religious ceremonies).
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The Supreme Court resolved that there is a substantial burden when
13
the penalty for non-compliance is very large.a
In these instances,
there is no need to decide whether the challenged law pressures the
challenger to modify their religious exercise because the substantial
13
penalty is presumed to provide the required pressure.a
Conversely,
the court in East Texas Baptist does not discuss the penalty for noncompliance because the court did not find any pressure to modify
beliefs."' Although the penalty for non-compliance with the contraceptive mandate is substantial,3 8 and would be levied if the employer did
not apply for an accommodation, the basis of RFRA is the freedom of
13
religion.a
When an employer is free to operate in accord with its
religious beliefs, there is no basis for a challenge under RFRA."4 o
Challenges brought under RFRA must be based on the actions of the
challenger for the substantial burden prong to be met.14' On a broader
scale, this decision marks the forward progression of women's rights
because the contraceptive mandate withstands its latest challenge. Some
employers are explicitly banned from allowing their religious beliefs to
govern the insurance coverage of their employees. There are more limits
on the scope of influence of religious employers. Nevertheless, some
believe that the courts may have gone too far in their findings.' 42
B.

The East Texas Baptist and Hobby Lobby Interplay
In practice, there is little difference between pre-ACA and post-ACA
contraceptive coverage. The employers who did not cover contraceptives
in their employee plans still, for the most part, refrain from covering

135. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. Justice Alito explicitly restricted the holding to
religious, closely-held corporations. Id. at 2759-60. He did not, as Sharpe suggests, give the
decision a broader applicability, especially when there is a viable alternative to direct
violation of religious belief. Id.; Sharpe, 801 F.3d at 941-42.
136. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777-78; E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 458.
137. See generally E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d 449.
138. A tax of $100 a day per each employee affected is the penalty for non-compliance.
I.R.C. § 4980D(b)(1) (2012); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
139. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 463.

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1472-73
(2015); Matthew J. Frank, Fifth Cir. Taken in by HHS Peek-a-Boo, NAT'L REV.: BENCH
MEMOS (June 23, 2015, 3:45 PM), www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/420202/fifthcircuit-taken-hhs-peek-boo-matthew-j-franck; Tom Howell Jr., Religious Nonprofits Not
Losing FaithAfter Latest Failed ObamacareBirth Control Mandate Appeal, WASH. TIMES
(July 2, 2015), www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/2/religious-nonprofits-not-losingfaith-after-latest/.
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them due to religious exemptions and accommodations.14 3 Women,
now, do not have to pay out-of-pocket for contraceptives because insurers
are required to provide separate coverage." Employers did not, preACA, have the right to prevent employees from paying out-of-pocket for
their contraceptives. Now, they do not have the right to prevent insurers
or TPAs from providing separate coverage. The Fifth Circuit keeps the
focus of RFRA on the acts of the challenger. 145 It merely applies
Sherbert-test decisions to the substantial burden requirement under
RFRA.1 4 6
Judge Smith distinguished East Texas Baptist from Hobby Lobby.14 1
The latter decision does not bind the Fifth Circuit because, at the time
of Hobby Lobby, a closely-held corporation was not eligible for an
accommodation to the contraceptive mandate, whereas the plaintiffs in
East Texas Baptist are eligible for an accommodation.'" Justices Alito
and Kennedy, in dicta in Hobby Lobby, provide support for the Fifth
Circuit's decision."" The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the accommodation
available to religious employers is very similar to that of the Supreme
Court Justices'. Taken together, East Texas Baptist and Hobby Lobby
provide boundaries in the Fifth Circuit. Hobby Lobby establishes that
closely-held corporations have personhood and can have a religion,
expanding the boundaries of RFRA further than they have ever
been. 5 o Thus, corporations can influence healthcare choices made by
their employees if those choices are contrary to the corporation's religion.
However, East Texas Baptist brings the boundary back by firmly keeping

143. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 462-64. The self-insured challengers in the instant
case, and those in other circuits, are concerned that the government lacks the authority to
prevent the insurance companies from charging the challengers for contraceptive coverage.
Id. The Fifth Circuit declines to issue any judgement on this point because the issue is not
"ripe." Id. at 462. It is a hypothetical challenge, no more than a worry of the challengers,
because there are no allegations that an insurance company charged, or is charging, for
contraceptive coverage. Id. at 462-63. As such, there is no hardship shown, one of two
conditions precedent for legal "ripeness." Id. Neither have the challengers shown that the
court declining to rule on the issue would cause harm. Id. The lack of showing on these two
conditions precludes the court from reaching a decision on the issue. Id.
144. Id. at 453-54.
145. Id. at 459.
146. Nw. Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, 485 U.S at 449 (coercion to violate religious
beliefs; penalization of religious activities or beliefs; denying a person privileges, rights, or
benefits, based on religious beliefs or exercises would constitute a substantial burden on
religious exercise).
147. See E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 458.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 462.
150. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767-75.
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the focus of RFRA on the actions of the religious challenger. While the
Fifth Circuit's decision focused on the religious employers, the court did
not bind the application of its holding to that group of employers.
Therefore, any employer who might qualify for an accommodation must
show that some action they have to take is contrary to their religious
beliefs. However, the offensive conduct or action must be one that
directly impacts the employer.'' A statutory duty of a third-party that
influences employees could not be challenged under RFRA.1 5
The insurance system pre-ACA was piece-meal-each state had its own
regulations and standards for coverage.' 53 In addition, there were
federal regulations that intersected with the state standards."5 The
ACA federalized health insurance by providing one standard for the
entire country.'"' As a consequence, pieces of the legislation affect
pockets of the marketplace differently. East Texas Baptist and Hobby
Lobby show some of the implications of this federalization.1 5 6 The
contraceptive mandate was designed to govern all employers and
insurers. 7 It was rigid in its application, as evidenced in Hobby
Lobby.' The Supreme Court upheld that challenge because there was
no flexibility in the rule as it applied to Hobby Lobby's specific pocket of
the marketplace;' the Court had to create the necessary flexibility.
East Texas Baptist shows another pocket of application. This pocket was
given flexibility in the ACA itself. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit did not
side with the challengers, who essentially wanted to see "what [they] can
extract from the government."'6 o These two decisions show that
federalizing insurance can work. The system takes care of the issues
naturally, which is perhaps a good thing.

151. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 459.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwartz, Saving Small-Employer Health
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1943 (2013); Rituparna Basu, The Broken State of
American Health Insurance Prior to the Affordable Care Act: A Market Rife with
Government Distortion, PAC. RES. INST. 7-11 (2013), available at https://www.pacific
research. org/fileadmin/documents/Studies/PDFs/ 2013-2015/BasuF2.pdf.
154. See Basu, supra note 153.
155. Supra note 87 and accompanying text.
156. See id.
157. 42 U.S.C.A § 18022; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a).
158. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (discussing the accommodation process for
religious nonprofit employers and noting that the HHS does not provide an explanation for
why there is no similar exemption for the religious for-profit employers).
159. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-82, 2785.
160. Roy, 476 U.S. at 700 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412).

2016]

C.

ACA CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE

453

The Accident that is Employer-Based Insurance

Employer-based insurance is a historical accident."'' It is not
necessarily the best idea for a society to tie health and wellness services
to productivity."' Many employers act as both employers and health

161. Ezekiel Emanuel, Keynote Speech: Opening Remarks, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y
L. & ETHICS 27, 27-28 (2015); see also Steven L. Willborn, Labor Law and the Race to the
Bottom, 65 MERCER L. REV. 369, 400 (2014). Historically, hospitals were places for the
indigent, generally where they went to die. Alex Blumberg & Adam Davidson, Accidents
ofHistory Created U.S. Health System, NPR (Oct. 22, 2009), www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=114045132. Anyone who could afford it paid a physician to treat them
at home. With the advent of modern medicine, health care became much more effective
and, due to that effectiveness along with greater costs for treatment, more expensive. Id.
Still, hospitals were not getting patients other than those who were very ill, so Baylor
University Hospital (Texas) came up with a system that evolved into Blue Cross (of Blue
Cross/Blue Shield). This idea was that employees of a business would pay a small amount
each month and the hospital would pay the entire cost of hospital visits. Id. Coverage of
this sort spread nation-wide but was not very popular. World War II was the catalyst for
wide-spread employer-based insurance. Wage freezes led employers to begin offering
benefits as a way of attracting employees, and so circumventing governmental regulations.
One of these benefits was health insurance coverage. Id. This benefit became a popular
offering and continues through today for a variety of reasons, primarily related to financial
motives for employers, employees, and insurance companies. Employer Health Insurance
- The History and Economic Theory of Employer-provided Health Insurance, JRANK
MEDICINE ENCYCLOPAEDIA, http://medicine.jrank.org/pages/561/Employee-Health-Insurancehistory-economic-theory-employer-provided-health-insurance.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2016); Ellen O'Brien, Employers' Benefits from Workers' HealthInsurance, NAT'L CTR. FOR
BIOTECH. INFO. (Mar. 2003), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2690190.
162. See, e.g., Willborn, supra note 161, at 386-400 (labor law discussion of workers'
injuries and methods of payment for medical treatment and lost wages, including worker's
compensation and insurance). Even pre-ACA, there was talk of changing the system.
Purchasing power (the ability to negotiate for lower rates as a group) is one of the greatest
benefits of the employer-based system, but it is not tied to the employer-based system.
Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Ron Wyden, Why Tie Health Insurance to a Job?, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
10, 2008, 12:01 AM), www.wsj.com/articles/SB 122887085038593345. While the ACA's goal
is for every American to have health insurance, there are still many Americans who do not
have health insurance. Melissa Majerol, Vann Newkirk & Rachel Garfield, The Uninsured:
A Primer- Key Facts About Health Insurance and the Uninsuredin America, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Jan. 13, 2015), availableat http://files.kff.org/attachment/primer-the-uninsured-aprimer-key-facts-about-health-insurance-and-the-uninsured-in-the-era-of-health-reform. The
system, as implemented, does not work; not all Americans are employed, and social
programs only go so far (especially with state control of Medicaid). Id. Cost was still a
major prohibitive factor for those still uninsured in 2014, three years after the implementation of the ACA. Id. Further, employers can use the text of the ACA to avoid providing
insurance for some employees. See, e.g., Monahan & Schwartz, supra note 153, at 1939
(potential for strategic behavior by small employers). The ACA states the requirements for
who would be considered full-time employees (to whom the employer is required to provide
insurance coverage), and keeping more employees as part-time is both legal and evasive
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insurance agents.' There must be a line drawn between when an
employer is an employer and when it is an insurance agent. The Fifth
Circuit touches on this question when it discusses contracts. 164 The
court noted that employees contracted with their employers for the
employer-based insurance plans.16 ' However, when the employer has
an accommodation, the contract for the contraceptive coverage is
between the employees and insurers and does not involve the employer
at all. 6 6 Therefore, the employer acts as an insurance agent when it
pays for or provides insurance, but when the insurer offers separate
coverage to the employee, the employer does not assume the role of
insurance agent. This distinction is important because when the
employer objects to specific coverages that are provided directly by the
insurer to the employees, the employer cannot show harm since there
was no harm done to them.1 6 7

Cases such as East Texas Baptist, Sharpe, and even Hobby Lobby show
one of the most prominent issues with employer-based insurance: the
employer could be allowed to decline coverage for certain services that
it believes to be against its stated beliefs.' 6 Although there are
statutory safeguards in place to ensure coverage for contraception,' 6 9
ACA standardization of health plans provides the only security for

of the ACA's mandate. I.R.C. § 4980 (2012). Health insurance is generally the deciding
factor in whether a person gets medical care and the level of care a person receives. See
Majerol, Newkirk & Garfield, supra. The uninsured are less likely to take advantage of
preventative care, which means that the care they do receive will occur when they are sick
and, therefore, will be more expensive and more extensive. Id. But those who can not afford
insurance can not afford expensive medical bills, which places greater burden on
governments and health care providers. Id. Insurance is less expensive in the long-term,
but the ACA has not made it affordable for those in the income gap between Medicaideligible and when subsidies make private insurance coverage affordable. Id.
163. Employer-based insurance "covers over half of the non-elderly population." 2015
Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 22, 2015), kff.org/reportsection/ehbs-2015-summary-of-findings/. In 2013,57% of employers offered health insurance
to some of their employees, with most of those including coverage for the families of
employees. See Majerol, Hawkirk & Garfield, supra note 162. Almost 80% of employees
participate in an employer's health program when one is offered. O'Brien, supra note 161.
These figures have held very steady through 2015. However, despite a spike in 2010 to
69%, the number of employers offering insurance is still lower than 2000, at 68%. 2015
Employer Health Benefits Survey, supra, at 10 (Exhibit H).
164. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 460-61.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 461.
167. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at 462-63.
168. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751; Sharpe, 801 F.3d 927; E. Tex. Baptist, 793
F.3d 449.
169. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131.
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employees if employers have objections to providing other insurance
coverage."'o There are no options if an employer that is required to
provide insurance has a sincere religious objection to blood transfusions
and refuses to pay for them.17 ' Either Congress will have to create a
new accommodation, prompting more challenges that notification is as
objectionable as provision, or courts must balance the ACA, as written,
with a RFRA defense. The Supreme Court decision this year should
provide some certainty here, as it must decide whether the scope of an
employer's sincerely held religious beliefs can cover the actions of a

170.

See 42 U.S.C.S. § 18022 (outlines the benefits all insurance plans are required to

cover).
171. This Author has not been able to find a decision in a federal court regarding an
employer objecting to providing specific coverages mandated by the ACA, other than
contraceptives, sterilization, and abortion. However, while state and federal courts appear
to be skeptical of religious objections to medical procedures when they come from parentguardians refusing procedures for their children, courts are generally respectful of the
wishes of adults who refuse treatment. Compare Robidoux v. O'Brien, 643 F.3d 334 (1st
Cir. 2011) (criminal appeal of a life imprisonment sentence for murder)(deceased was the
child of the defendant, the defendant and his wife used breastmilk as the sole form of
nourishment for the deceased child due to religious beliefs, contrary to doctors' recommendations), and Jehovah's Witnesses of Wash. v. King Cnty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp.
488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944), a seminal religious liberty case in which the Court held that parental authority
is not absolute, and the government has wide latitude to regulate for child welfare, even
when regulated actions are required by a religion) (affirming the district court decision that
a state statute that allows a hospital to give a child blood transfusions despite religious
objections of the parents is constitutional), and People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104
N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952) (a parent's refusal on religious grounds to allow blood transfusions
for their minor child constituted abuse under Illinois statute, removal of the child from the
parents' home and appointing a guardian was appropriate), and In re McCauley, 565
N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1990) (it is in the interests of the child and of the state in protecting the
welfare of children to allow a hospital to give the child in question a blood transfusion,
despite the parents' religious objections), with Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991)
(a person has the right to refuse lifesaving blood transfusions for religious reasons, and
religious beliefs may only be questioned as to sincerity on cross-examination at trial)(death
resulting from refusal to allow lifesaving blood transfusions can fall under the avoidable
consequences doctrine of tort law), and Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1980)
(refusal to undergo surgery due to religious objections does not allow a court to deny
disability benefits if the objector is found to be disabled; religious beliefs are taken to be
sincere, no matter if they are personal interpretations or mainstream teachings). This line
of thinking might be relevant when looking forward to future potential challenges as the
ACA is fully implemented, and possibly changed through regulations, since Hobby Lobby
held that closely held for-profit corporations are to be considered people. Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2767-75. Although the majority of challenges have been for religious objections to
blood transfusions, the reasoning behind these decisions could be relevant to other
procedures such as the following: chemotherapy, organ transplants, stem-cell therapy, and
in vitro fertilization.
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third-party when the third-party generally acts only after notification by
the employer.1 7' The Court's decision should discuss health policy and
its legal implications, providing clarity and guidance for an area of law
that is constantly evolving. While the ACA is a start, health insurance
coverage cannot stay as it is. The system is too piece-meal and provides
too many exceptions, with holes allowing for expensive litigation as an
attempt to create others.17

There are three options for the future of insurance coverage. First, the
system continues as it is and different rules must apply when the
employer is acting as an insurance agent. This option is pro-employee
and is based on the premise that religious beliefs cannot abridge the
rights of others. Second, the system can move towards Hobby Lobby in
a broader application. This route is the pro-employer option because it
gives the employer control over their employees' healthcare options,
essentially allowing the employer's religion to govern the employees'
options. One solution for contraceptive coverage under this sort of system
would be to take healthcare out of insurance. Insurance is not health-

172. Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, & 15-191, E. Tex. Baptist Univ.
v. Burwell, 2016 WL 93989, *51-56 (U.S. 2016). The Court will also most likely determine
whether insurance companies have a duty to provide contraceptive coverage under the ACA
or whether it is a duty triggered by the self-certification process. Id. at *44-45. This issue
is at the heart of the circuit split on this contraception mandate challenge. The Fifth
Circuit concluded that the deference given to the sincerely held beliefs of the religious
employer did not extend to actions by third parties, even when those actions were to be
taken in response to the challenged action by the employer. E. Tex. Baptist, 793 F.3d at
459. This is because there is a statutory duty placed upon the TPAs and insurers, and the
notification process simply assists in a quicker and easier identification of who needs
contraceptive coverage offered to them. Id. Further, the Fifth Circuit held that courts
determine whether a challenged regulation pressures the challenger to modify their beliefs.
Id. at 456. Courts should not defer to the challenger's belief that the regulation pressures
them, partly because every challenger will claim there is this pressure. Id. However, the
Eighth Circuit, by equating pressure with burden, found that the facts were sufficiently
similar to Hobby Lobby (that there was significant pressure due to the noncompliance tax)
and struck the accommodation as unconstitutional. Sharpe, 801 F.3d at 937-38. It held that
courts will defer to the challenger and respect whatever line the religious challenger
decides they will not cross. Id. at 942. Further, the notification process is a trigger for
contraceptive coverage, and filling out the form would be, as the challengers argue,
facilitating the objectionable contraceptive coverage. Id.
173. See ObamaCare Lawsuits, OBAMACARE FACTS (June 25, 2015), obamacarefacts.
com/obamacare-lawsuitl (descriptions of most of the major lawsuits) (last visited Dec. 12,
2015); Melissa Quinn, How Obamacare Will Cost Native American Tribes Millions of
Dollars, DAILY SIGNAL (Sept. 21, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/21/how-obamacareDavid Whelan, HMO Implant
will-cost-native-american-tribes-millions-of-dollars/;
Nightmare: Batteries Not Included, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2009), www.forbes.com/2009/11/23/
(pre-ACA experimental
hmo-medical-implants-business-health-care-batteries.html
treatment definition vary between TPAs; not corrected by ACA).
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care; it is only a way to pay for care.' 7 4 Insurance is to protect against
an unpredictable future, not to pay for routine and predictable expenses.17 Contraceptive coverage is a predictable expense and should not
be covered by insurance. 1e However, for this system to work effectively, the cost of predictable expenses must not be prohibitive for the
general population.7 7 Third, the system could move away from
employer-based insurance. Individuals under this system would buy
their insurance coverage on the open market. 7 For those with different beliefs than their employer, there is no reason to continue employerbased coverage if the open market has the same options available.
Disentangling health insurance from employment would prevent further
religious challenges, as employers cannot control what health coverage
their employees buy when they have no part of the decision. '7 Perhaps
it is time to undo the historical accident.
M. CATHERINE NORMAN

174. See Trevor Burrus, From Status to Contract to Status: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
and the Primitivism of Politics, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 60, 66-67 (2015).
175. Id.; see also O'Brien, supra note 161.
176. Burrus, supra note 174, at 67.
177. Id.
178. For a free-market health insurance system to work, there would need to be a
substantial overhaul of the system. It could not be a patching of the holes as lobbyists and
Congress see them, as the ACA has done. Pre-ACA, free market health insurance had
grave issues including a lack of purchasing power and no tax breaks for individuals, which
led to higher costs and the widespread discrimination against those with preexisting
conditions who applied for insurance. Emanuel, supra note 161. An effective free-market
insurance system necessarily needs to include a way for any American who wants
insurance to be able to buy it, no matter health or financial status. However, the inherent
nature of a free market should create a market that will be able to meet the needs of the
public. See Sepper, supra note 142, at 1489-91.
179. In this system, there would be no government regulation of insurance, nor
mandated coverages. Burrus, supra note 174, at 67-68. The effects should include a
decrease in costs for insurance and medicine, as regulations and mandates are the driving
force behind ever-increasing prices. Id.

